This paper addresses the question of the social policy harmonization in the European Union. In adopting a common monetary policy, Europe is faced with structural and fiscal concerns, as national growth levels differ. Another possible factor in output shocks are the levels of various social expenditures in the member countries. OECD data on the level of social program expenditures in four EU countries will be compared to fluctuations in GDP growth to identify existing relationships. Significant relationships between independent social expenditure policy and GDP growth shocks suggest structural harmonization as an improvement if Europe is to take full advantage of the common market. However, the effects of expenditure levels may be easier to identify and predict than the dynamic effects of policy change. As the effects of future policy changes are more difficult to ascertain, harmonization may not consistently appear to be a Pareto-optimum solution to asymmetric shocks.
INTRODUCTION
In 2000, the Lisbon Labor and Social Affairs Councils consolidated a process of transformation in European policy style, which began in 1992 with recommendations on social protection "convergence." Policy innovation in favor of a social Europe occurred in two main areas: gender, with a series of initiatives "mainstreaming" gender equality across a wide array of European Union (EU) programs; and employment, with the "Luxembourg process" launched in 1997 seeking a coordination of national policies (See Rhodes 2000) . In July 1999, the Commission proposed a "concerted strategy for modernizing social protection." And under the Finnish presidency in 1999 a group of officials was asked to take the process forward. This group's first major report (May 2000) was submitted by Coreper and the Council to the European Council meeting held in Feira, Portugal, on the 19th and 20th June 2000, and its conclusions now underpin official EU policy.
The Portuguese presidency of the European Union in 2000 was the first one to put ahead on the European agenda the discussion on "Social Europe." Both the ethical and economic layers have been considered by the Portuguese presidency. Two key aspects can be emphasized. On the one hand, there has been a quest for a new synthesis in EU social policy, reconciling flexibility and security in labor markets, and solidarity and sustainability in broader welfare programs. Rhodes (2000) points out that the special meeting of the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000 underlined the need to create an "active welfare state" via a "positive strategy, which combines competitiveness with social cohesion." The Commission's Broad Economic Policy Guidelines published shortly before the Lisbon Summit presents a clear recipe for reform combining at once the ethical dimensions with the economic one: "reducing the tax burden on low-wage labor, encouraging real wages to increase in line with labor productivity, facilitating access to training, reforming tax and benefit systems to ensure appropriate incentives and rewards for participation in active working life and negotiating a modernization of labor markets including flexible working hours and a review of tight job protection legislation and high severance payments."
On the other hand, there has also been a search for a middle path between EU intervention via directives and the alternative of leaving policy instruments in the hands of the member states, thereby renouncing broader social policy ambitions. As emphasized by Mosher (2000) , the "open method of coordination", as outlined by the Portuguese Presidency, is composed of four elements: 1) fixed guidelines set for the Union with short, medium, and long term goals; 2) quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 3) European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets; and 4) periodic monitoring, evaluation, and peer review, organized as a mutual learning process (Portuguese Presidency, 2000) .
Thus, previously considered by EU policy makers, the next question in the economic literature is the organization of the welfare state. The logic is that an integrated market may require individual states to relinquish some control of their welfare policies. Indeed, the issues surrounding the reform of social expenditures are relevant for two reasons. First, asymmetric economic shocks may be generated by differences in social expenditures. Second, with integration into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) the individual countries have come under pressure to limit public spending in order to keep public deficits within the boundaries of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). This constraint will limit the ability to have an individual fiscal response during an asymmetric shock. Considering the relatively high level of taxation of large countries (for instance, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) compared to lower tax jurisdictions such as Ireland and the ten new EU countries, an increase in taxes is not an option in the face of an economic shock. More than before, a country has to consider structural reforms to increase its ability to respond to shocks: a more efficient welfare state would leave more room for a fiscal response to shocks. This paper seeks to answer the question about the relevancy of the convergence of the European welfare states. The integration of different welfare states thus requires attention, as the economic ramifications of expenditure convergence are relevant. In our study, we analyze the welfare state by extrapolating measurement from social expenditure data.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The definition of the welfare state is broader in Europe than in any other part of the world, and there is no doubt that the expenditures associated with this welfare state definition impact the structure of the states themselves. Nevertheless, while all countries in Europe have advanced welfare states, they are structured differently and require different amounts of funding. These differences may be one of the causes of divergent GDP growth rates in an otherwise more than ever unified Europe. Hence, questions are now arising on the structural side. Johnson (1968) dealt with the question of the application of economic theory to social issues. The definition of the welfare state that we are going to retain considers two components, one fiscal and one structural. The former deals with social expenditures. In the latter, welfare regulations form the basis of welfare policy.
WELFARE STATE AS THE NEXT STEP
Changes in European policies due to the belonging to the EMU could contribute to natural convergence between countries in public expenditures (Hitiris and Nixon 2001) . Still, some in the literature indicate that these differences are important enough so as to necessitate harmonization to speed up economic integration (Hitiris 1997) .
The construction of the European Union is centered on monetary policy, with control of fiscal policy left to the individual countries. An uncoordinated fiscal policy leaves individual countries with more independence, but will undermine monetary coordination if there are no limitations to fiscal policy (Delors 1989) . The SGP is a form of policy coordination designed to deal with problems associated with a fiscally decentralized Europe and forestall deleterious individual fiscal policy and limit free riding. Depending on the organization of the welfare state, one-way migration traffic may occur in Europe, from states with poorly organized social systems to well-organized welfare states (Holmlund and Kolm 2000) . Different welfare structures will cause migrations toward beneficial systems.
WELFARE STATE AND COMPETITIVENESS Alesina and Perotti (1997) examine the impact of the composition of government spending on competitiveness. Distinguishing between spending funded by reduced government spending and spending funded by an increase in taxes yields different outcomes for the economy. As competitiveness is affected by how the welfare state is funded, considerations arise for harmonization. The range of harmonization possibilities includes measures such as common fiscal budgets; new free riding possibilities present themselves when a collective budget and individual taxation policy are allowed. Perotti (1996) demonstrates that the composition of the welfare state matters, which is relevant to considerations of fiscal policy consolidation. Cutting government spending creates a long-term impact on a budget; whereas measures such as tax increases and capital spending cuts have effects that are shorter-lived. Both GDP growth and competitiveness will be impacted by the structure of the welfare-distribution mechanism. The relationship between social expenditure and GDP growth becomes important with the consideration of harmonization. Effective limitations of government spending, while promoting growth, can be achieved more readily under certain conditions. Therefore, combining various welfare states and various welfare state mechanisms becomes political and economic. When these different approaches center on social expenditure, it becomes necessary to study the nature of such expenditures and their relationship to the welfare state.
THE WELFARE STATE AND EUROPE
The Portuguese EU presidency has put in place a new European architecture for social policy, something that could one day be considered Europe's "Maastricht" for the welfare state. The welfare state is a notion covered in the economic literature as well as the European economic integration, but the combination of the two is still brand new.
A major reason to study the welfare state harmonization or coordination comes from the costs of a non-converging Europe. Indeed, it seems important to question whether regional asymmetric shocks were also related to different levels of spending in the welfare state programs (for instance, health care) through the EU countries. As the EU moves toward economic integration levels of income, convergence will accelerate. The convergence of income-dependent variables, such as health care expenditure, will also quicken. The possibility that health care expenditures in the EU are currently approaching common levels despite the lack of harmonization policies so far signals the benefit of considering such policies for the future (Hitiris and Nixon 2001) .
Members of the EU are under pressure to curtail spending to stay within the bounds of the Stability and Growth Pact, and some of this pressure will be placed on health care budgets, possibly leading toward a common level.
THE MODEL METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this paper is based on a non-parametric time-series analysis. As we want to capture specificities in the impacts of social expenditure among European countries, it is more conclusive to study pairs of countries, rather than doing a cross-sectional time-series analysis. In such a pooled regression, the isolation of a specific variable is more complex.
The goal of the econometrics is twofold: checking the impact of social expenditure on GDP growth rates, and see how the change in social expenditure explains the change in growth rates.
Indeed, on the one hand, we want to check whether there are structural impacts of national social expenditure on the growth rates. More precisely, the first set of regressions is designed to capture what percentage change among the different social programs -if any -explains the percentage change in the country's growth rate. If there is any difference across countries -id est the same percentage change in one welfare program in one country has not the same impact across countries -then harmonization might be desirable, as long as harmonization policies would not generate new costs 1 . What is important is not the level of the expenditure, but the level of the difference between countries. We will present the best results of the analysis based on the four largest participants of the EMU: France, Italy, Germany, and Spain.
On the other hand, once the structural impacts specific to each individual welfare programs have been identified within a country, the next question is to identify the impact of an economic policy aiming at creating welfare objectives. In other words, what would the implementation of an harmonization policy generate in terms of output shocks? We will approximate these potential effects by calculating first the percentage changes in social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. In defining social expenditure as a percentage of GDP -and no longer in levels as for the first purpose of the econometrics -we control for the country's sizes.
THE DATA SET
There are many different ways of measuring the welfare state (Slesnick 1998) ; this paper will follow Barr (1992)'s methodology. Social expenditure data is used to reflect the composition of social welfare programs in European states. The data is from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (the 'SOCX' database), a data set covering social expenditures both public and private in OECD countries from 1980-1998. The model examines changes in GDP growth and fluctuation in social expenditures, to provide a meaningful foundation for an assessment of structural harmonization in Europe.
For this model, we have reformulated the database categories for consistency and relevancy of the data set across countries 2 . The independent variables we will consider are:
• 'Unemployment' programs as defined by the OECD, and denotedU .
• 'Health care' expenditure as defined by the OECD, and denoted H .
• 'Old Age Oriented' variable as an own-computed variable (denoted OA ), which is the sum of the OECD-defined programs 'Services for the elderly and disabled' (denoted O ), and 'Old age cash benefits'.
1 For instance, the implementation of the harmonization policy, as we will see further, may generate costs. From a more macroeconomic perspective, one can argue harmonization may mean enforcing a tax cartel at relatively high level of taxation compared to lower tax jurisdictions. 2 The reformulated data set includes some unaltered categories of the OECD database, such as 'Unemployment' and 'Old Age Cash Benefits,' but it also includes variables such as the 'Family Oriented' variable reflecting the levels of several programs of similar aim.
• 'Family Oriented' variable as a reformulated variable (denoted F ), which is the sum of the OECD-defined programs 'Family cash benefits' and 'Family services'. It includes public expenditures to support households of more than one person.
• 'Disability Oriented' variable as an own-computed variable (denoted D ). The 'Disability oriented' variable is meant to cover benefits awarded to people to compensate for income lost through sickness, injury, or the death of a spouse.
In terms of percentage of public social expenditure, data do not clearly demonstrate a convergence of unemployment, disability, family and old age programs (see Figures 1, 2, 3 & 4) . Indeed, the changing process itself, from a national economy structured by the national social expenditure to a more homogeneous structure, could also create negative externalities. Hence, on the other hand, we measure the impact of a policy that would give way to the European harmonization of social expenditure, the so-called "dynamic effect" model presented below. For econometric consistency, we first verified that the change in levels of social expenditures from year to year contribute to fluctuations in GDP. 
RESULTS

STRUCTURAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE ON GROWTH RATES
The purpose of this first analysis is to extract from the data the overall picture of any impact of social expenditure on the structure of the national economies. This methodology may provide insights into which specific countries can benefit or not from harmonization policies.
The model will look at differences in changes in GDP growth between pairs of countries relative to changes in social expenditures such as spending on education, health care, and the variables available with the OECD data that the model will use. The purpose of these tests is to build on the demonstration that the level of social expenditure in various programs has an impact on GDP by regressing the differences in GDP growth between countries on the changes in the level of social expenditure in those countries.
We have taken different econometric approaches to analyzing the data. Breitung (2002) 
The dependent variable, GDP , captures the difference in changes in GDP growth for a pair of countries denoted i and j . The year is denoted y .
The independent variables that we have chosen to test are: differences in unemployment programs (denoted U ) between countries i and j , differences in health care programs (denoted H ), differences in old age benefits (denoted OA ), differences in family benefits (denoted F ), differences in services for the elderly and disabled (denoted O ), and differences in disability programs (denoted D ).
The results presented are the ones statistically significant (see Table 1 ). They are whether linear or otherwise, heteroscedastistically robust, and lagged. ANOVA tests did not reveal multicollinearity or covariance. As this model represents purely structural effects, the coefficients of the Italy-Germany regression are anticipated. Unemployment benefits generally have a negative impact on GDP, as do disability benefits, but raising the lifetime consumption function of the elderly increases output.
The diversity of the results among pairs is noticeable, and shows the very high degree of specificity of each country in terms of the relationship between social expenditure and GDP growth rate. This complex picture of statistically significant and insignificant results, combined with different weights for the same welfare program across countries, is one part of the explanation why Europe faces idiosyncratic output shocks. This last point may encourage policy makers to push further the idea of welfare state harmonization.
DYNAMIC IMPACTS OF THE SOCIAL EXPENDITURE ON THE GROWTH RATES
We control now for the size of the country by dividing the changes in the different programs by GDP. Indeed, changes in social expenditure as a percentage of GDP from year to year reflect policy change. Policy differences between two countries may impact their output, causing their levels of growth to diverge. One of those first two countries, and another, a third country may also have divergent growth levels, but at a rate different still from that between the first two countries. Asymmetric shocks due to discrepancies in social expenditures between countries may exist.
To investigate this possibility, the change in GDP is regressed on the change in the level of social expenditure at the program level as a fraction of GDP. The changes in program size as a percentage of GDP are examined for France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and then the differences in program and output growth are examined between each country. Variables are derived:
Where is the percentage change in program expenditure as a percentage of GDP from the previous year, p is the social program (U, H, OA, F, O, or D) , i is the country, and y is the year considered.
When comparing two countries i and j , the variable 
Breitung (2002) non-parametric test was again used to test for the presence of unit roots in the independent variables. The model was significant overall and heteroscedastistically robust. Variables where a unit root is present are replaced with the natural log of the variable when that improves the unit root test. Multicollinearity has not been observed.
The heterogeneity of the following results suggests that policy changes would have variable impacts on output, adding further uncertainty to harmonization considerations. All six combinations of the four countries chosen were examined for different combinations of variables, but we present in the following table only the results with statistical significance (see Table 2 ). France, Italy, and Spain all produce significant results when their policy changes' impact on GDP is compared with Germany. The lack of statistical significance for some of the pairs (e.g. France-Spain) may have in fact an economic meaning: we can't explain the change in GDP by the change in social expenditure, then an harmonization policy -pushing for a change in social expenditure by definition -is likely not an issue for the pair considered. The signs of the coefficients of the Italy-Germany model here are somewhat different from those found in the structural regression, with the Old age oriented variable having a negative coefficient while Unemployment and the Disability oriented variable both have positive coefficients. This may reflect the impact of changing policy, as opposed to the level (like in the structural regression), decreasing the importance of factors such as the opportunity cost of not working.
Based on these regressions, we can conclude that there are at least significant differences in the relationships between countries. Differences between countries' growth rates can be explained by social expenditure sometimes, but the inconsistent signs of the coefficients show that the differences are not uniform. The irregularities of these dynamic effects will be addressed with the policy implications.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The policy implications may be twofold. First, the analysis focused on explaining changes in GDP by changes in the amount of specific components of social expenditure. Broadly, changes in GDP are determined by many different variables, from wage levels, to firm profits, to regulations. Using the first set of regressions, we can show that changes in GDP are also related to changes in social expenditure. Moreover, we can see the different weights between countries of each individual social program in the change in GDP.
Second, knowing that social expenditure in the individual countries can explain changes in GDP growth, the next step was to explain the impact of changes in social expenditure programs on differences in GDP growth levels between countries.
We have thus measured two effects, one structural and one dynamic. The structural effect captures the weight of the component programs in total social expenditure. With the dynamic effect, we capture the impact of changes on GDP growth.
On the one hand, the econometric results demonstrate that there is a relationship between the amount of program expenditure and changes in GDP between some countries. However, the differences in GDP growth between major countries are far from being uniform, which shows the complexity of the impact of welfare programs across countries.
On the other hand, we measure the existence of any dynamic effect: the relationship between changes in this weight and changes in GDP growth has been confirmed, underscoring the impact of social expenditure policy changes on output growth.
Based on the result that differences in social expenditure have an impact on GDP, there may be a Pareto-optimal level of social expenditure in Europe that can reduce discrepancies in GDP growth. Showing that while harmonization may be beneficial to smooth differences in GDP growth, harmonization must take into account the weight of each individual program in the different countries. By doing so, the harmonization will lead to a closer convergence of GDP growth rates. The Pareto-optimum solution is harmonization that eliminates the idiosyncratic output shocks, which stemmed also from different social expenditure levels.
However, the heterogeneity of the results obtained from the econometrics demonstrates that harmonization on a European level would be at least difficult. Moreover, we also observe a dynamic effect, the changes in policy themselves, which creates additional discrepancies in GDP growth for some pairs. Europe may consider that the Pareto-optimum situation is represented by no discrepancies in GDP growth, but the risk is that policy change may amplify differences in growth trends during the convergence period. Determination of an optimal expenditure level requires countries to converge, and when countries change their policies to meet this level, output growth will diverge. The possibility that this dynamic effect is larger than the gains represented by structural harmonization has to be considered. This result may confirm on the social policy side that harmonization may not bring convergence of GDP growth rates. As Krugman (1993) forecast for the economies of the EMU, harmonization of economic policy will lead to the amplification of regional comparative advantage; in other words, divergence.
Nevertheless, these results do not conclude in favour of cooperation to the expenses of harmonization. However, a third-way -safer than the two extremescould be found: the "open coordination" notion used in Luxembourg. Indeed, as pointed out by Scharpf (1997) , the policymakers could be inspired by the Stability and Growth Pact and propose a harmonized price-floor for welfare spending in each country (the current average is close to 25% of the GDP spent on welfare programs) leaving the freedom to allocate the resources on each program fitting with the country's culture. It would help create the incentive to converge without imposing strict procedures and facing the paradoxical outcome of harmonization: divergence.
